The purpose of this note is to point out an error in a widely cited paper by Sharpe (1990) on long-term bank-…rm relationships and to provide a correct analysis of the problem. The model studies repeated lending under asymmetric information which leads to winner's-curse type distortions of competition. Contrary to the claims in Sharpe (1990) , this game only has an equilibriuim in mixed strategies, which features a partial informational lock-in by …rms and random termination of lending relationships.
In a widely cited paper, Sharpe (1990) has formulated a model of corporate borrowing under asymmetric information which provides a theoretical explanation of long-term bank-…rm relationships. While the model is conceptually important and makes a main feature of actual lending relationships amenable to theoretical analysis, the analysis o¤ered in the paper is not correct. The purpose of this note is to point out the error and to provide a correct analysis of the problem. Furthermore, I want to draw attention to the work by Fischer (1990) , who has studied a simpler version of the same problem independently and correctly, though not with full mathematical rigour. Sharpe (1990) and Fischer (1990) consider a model of repeated corporate borrowing under adverse selection, in which lenders obtain inside information about their borrowers' quality. This inside information gives existing lenders an informational advantage over potential competitors at the re…nancing stage and reduces ex-post competition. Hence, an initial situation of competition between symmetrically informed lenders turns into one of asymmetric information once one lender has attracted the business and dealt with the customer for some time. Since borrowers and lenders rationally anticipate that the borrower will be "informationally captured" in the relationship in the future, initial …nance is o¤ered at a discount which re ‡ects the expected mark up on future terms of …nance.
In the absence of binding long-term contracts, these future terms of …-nance are determined at the re…nancing stage by competition between the inside lender and potential outside competitors. The analysis of this interaction -a contract o¤er game under asymmetric information -provided by Sharpe (1990) is incorrect. In Proposition 1, he identi…es two pure-strategy Nash equilibria for one version of this game, in Proposition 2 one purestrategy Nash equilibrium for another version. However, these games do not have pure-strategy equilibria at all.
The principal reason for the non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria in this situation is a "winner's curse" type phenomenon, known from the theory of competitive bidding (see, e.g., Wilson (1967) , Milgrom and Weber (1982) ).
1 Under asymmetric information about the common value of an object -here: the pro…tability of a lending contract -the fact that a bid wins contains information about the value of the object. In particular, the higher the bid by an individual bidder -here: the lower the interest rate o¤ered by a single lender -the higher is not only the probability of obtaining the object, but also that the object, if obtained, is estimated by others to be of lower value. Therefore, bidding in such situations must not only take individual private information into account, but also the information that would be revealed by the fact that the bid wins over the others. This limits the viability of standard overbidding (undercutting) strategies à la Bertrand, without completely eliminating the incentives to use them. As a consequence, pure strategies, which are directly vulnerable to overbidding (undercutting), cannot constitute an equilibrium. However, mixed-strategy equilibria exist, because through optimal randomization competitors can balance the gains from increasing the bid's success probability and the losses from decreasing the expected value of the object conditional on winning.
The similarities between banking competition for corporate customers and bidding in auctions with common values have …rst been explored by Broecker (1990) in a model of interbank competition under imperfect information acquisition. In particular, Broecker (1990) studies the nature of the resulting mixed-strategy equilibria if the number of competing banks becomes large. Rajan (1992) , which enriches the Fischer-Sharpe model by the possibility of long-term lending, …nds a mixed-strategy equilibrium in a situation similar to that of Sharpe (1990) .
Equilibrium in mixed strategies is the appropriate formalization of the intuition of "uneven competition" between inside and outside lenders for the provision of continuation …nance. While informed lenders can be expected to capture some informational rent in this game, it is implausible that they can completely dictate the terms of the contract. Yet, any deterministic countero¤er to such dictatorial insider o¤ers by an outsider would, in turn, fall prey to selective undercutting by the insider, leaving the outsider with losses. However, randomization of o¤ers allows the outsider to keep the rents extracted by the insider in check, without exposing herself too directly to the thrust of the insider's superior information.
2 Empirically, therefore, the model predicts a limited informational capture of borrowers in bank-…rm relationships, with interest rates charged above the market rate and occasional switching of borrowers in equilibrium. Although …rm-level studies of pricing and termination in lending relationships are still rare and sometimes di¢cult to interpret, these predictions seem to correspond to observed behaviour in bank-…rm relationships (see, e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1994) , Angelini, Di Salvo, Ferri (1998) , Ongena and Smith (1997) , and Degryse and van Cayseele (2000) .
The remainder of this note is organized as follows. Section I summarizes the model formulated by Sharpe, using the terminology of the paper as much as possible. Section II describes and brie ‡y discusses the mixed-strategy equilibrium for a slightly simpli…ed version of the model. The appendix contains the proof, which may be of some more general interest, because it derives the equilibrium properties directly, instead of adapting the general results of Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber (1983) .
The Model
There is a continuum of …rms (not necessarily risk-neutral) who all want to carry out a sequence of two investment projects. For each …rm, the project at time t = 1; 2 transforms an investment of I t at the beginning of the period (I t is chosen by the …rm) into a random return at the end of the period. This return depends on the …rm's quality, q, and is given by ( X t = g(I t )I t with probability p q 0 with probability 1 ¡ p q ;
where g is strictly decreasing and concave. 3 For each …rm, returns for project 1 and 2 are stochastically independent, and the same is true across …rms. There are two possible qualities of …rms, q = L; H, with p L < p H . The proportion of high quality …rms, H, is µ 2 (0; 1), and this is common knowledge. Firms do not know their own quality.
Because the key issue in Sharpe's (1990) paper is the problem of informational capture in relationship lending and because the variable investment case is a trivial extension, I assume from now on that project sizes I 1 and I 2 are …xed. Furthermore, to save on unnecessary indices, I consider the borrowing problem of one given …rm, randomly drawn from the pool described 3 Clearly, one needs that g(I)¸1 + r for some I.
above.
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The …rm has no own funds, but can borrow from competing banks. Banks are risk-neutral, compete à la Bertrand, and have unlimited access to funds at the net interest rate r per period. Like the …rm, banks do not know the …rm's quality at the beginning of period 1. However, if a bank …nances the …rm's …rst project, it perfectly observes the outcome of the project, which provides information about the …rm's quality. Denote by°= ( S if …rst period result is X 1 F if …rst period result is 0 the …rm's performance in the …rst project. It is assumed that the …rst project is …nanced by at most one bank, 5 which becomes the "inside bank". "Outside banks", who have not provided …rst round …nance, each get an identical, costless noisy signal of°, e°, de…ned by
with 0 · © < 1. In the limiting case of © = 1 inside and outside banks are both perfectly informed about the …rst-period outcome; this case is trivial. If © = 0, the outside banks do not observe anything. Sharpe (1990) considers both the case of e°being observed by the inside bank (his Proposition 2) and of e°not being observed by the inside bank (Proposition 1). Both analyses are similar and contain a similar error; to economise on space and because the case of unobserved e°may be less intuitive, I focus here on the latter case. The key assumption concerning the strategic interaction among the players is the absence of binding long-term contracting possibilities.As forcefully argued by Sharpe (1990) , this absence of long-term contracts is the interesting scenario to consider: without it the analysis would reduce to standard competitive pricing and miss the important point in bank relationships. The dynamic game played between the …rm and the banks then has the following structure: t = 1 1. Each bank j announces a short-term lending rate r 
The …rm chooses an o¤er and invests I
2 . If indi¤erent, the …rm stays with the inside bank. 6. The …rm repays (1 + r 2 )I 2 i¤ the second project has been successful.
The presentation of this game is slightly di¤erent from the one in Sharpe (1990) , but both games are identical (with the restriction to one …rm in my version).
6 Apart from the absence of long-term contracting possibilities, two other assumptions of the model are 1. The …rm consumes any pro…t after the …rst period.
2. Outstanding debt after a failure of the …rst project is forgiven.
The …rst assumption excludes the possibility of using retained earnings for investment and signaling purposes in the second period. The second eliminates all contractual links between the two periods, in particular, …rms can switch freely from one bank to another despite their credit history.
7 While 6 The reader may suspect a di¤erence in substance in stage 4, where Sharpe (1990) assumes that "each bank j makes o¤ers of credit r 2 j (°) to its previous customers, contingent upon the observed outcomes°. Each bank j observes a signal e°(f ) of the …rst-period performance of those …rms that borrowed from other banks. It also observes the lending policies (r 2 h (°)) of their banks, but not individual o¤ers. It then makes credit o¤ers (r 2 jh (e°)) to customers of each bank h 6 = j." Despite the wording, since outsiders do not observe the inside o¤ers, insiders and outsiders e¤ectively move simultanously. The fact that outsiders observe "lending policies" is simply the Nash assumption. 7 The second assumption is innocuous as long as X 2 is su¢ciently large relative to X 1 . Then, here as in practice, …rms can switch banks even when in …nancial distress, if the new bank rolls over the old debt. The more restrictive assumption is the …rst one, because a successful …rm has an interest to put up X 1 ¡ (1 + r 1 )I 1 as a contribution towards the second project, thereby signaling its type (by construction, a°= F …rm cannot do that).
The problem disappears if one assumes that X 1 is su¢ciently small relative to I 1 (which is reasonable, because the model wants to explain the lock-in of once unpro…table but now successful …rms). An alternative model in which the …rst assumption can be relaxed would be to assume that the inside bank observes the …rm's quality q, whereas the …rm and the outside banks only observe the project outcome°. Then the informational asymmetry is preserved, but signaling is ruled out by construction. these assumptions are somewhat extreme, they are useful simpli…cations to highlight the role of intertemporal informational constraints in bank competition. 8 Before analysing the model, it is useful to introduce, just as Sharpe (1990) , some benchmark loan rates and notation. Let
denote the success probabilities of the …rm's second project, if there is, respectively, no information about …rst-period performance (equation (1)), if the …rst-period outcome has been observed to be good (equation (2)), and if the …rst-period outcome has been observed to be bad (equation (3)).
Similarly, by Bayes' rule, the success probabilities conditional on the noisy observation e°are given by
Using these probabilities, one can de…ne hypothetical zero-pro…t loan rates in each of these …ve situations:
1 + r e
Clearly,
The …nal assumption is that (1 + r F )I 2 · X 2 , i.e. that second-period lending is pro…table even if the …rm is known to have failed in the …rst period. The natural solution concept for this game is Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) ).
10 The interesting part of the analysis of this game is the bidding competition between banks in the second period (Propositions 1 and 2 in Sharpe (1990) ). The …rm's response to competing bids is completely mechanic, and bank competition in stage 1 is standard bidding under symmetric information for the informational rent to be reaped in t = 2.
The bidding game in the second period is a Bayesian game whose information structure (i.e. players' types and priors) has been determined in period 1. Denote pure strategies of outside banks by r h = r h (e°), let r o = r o (e°) = min h r h (e°), and denote a pure strategy of the inside bank by r i = r i (°).
Proposition 1: The bidding game in stage 4 has no Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. 9 It is straightforward to analyse the model without this assumption, in which case bad performers are excluded from continuation …nance by the inside bank.
10 This is as in Sharpe (1990) , although he does not state this explicitly.
1) Suppose that r o (e°) < r e°f or e°= e S or e°= e F . Such an o¤er attracts at best (if r o (e°) < r i (S)) the S-and the F -type …rm. In this case, e°is an unbiased estimator of the …rm's°and the winning outside bank would make a strictly positive expected loss. Contradiction.
2) Suppose that r i (S) > max(r o ( e S); r o ( e F )). By 1) and (9), a deviation by the inside bank to max(r o ( e S); r o ( e F )) would raise expected pro…ts on the S-type strictly above zero. Contradiction.
3) Suppose that r o (e°) < r i (S) < r F for e°= e S or e°= e F . By 2),
. By the optimality of r i (S), we must have r i (S) = max(r o ( e S); r o ( e F )). Because r i (F ) · r i (S) (which is smaller than r F ) is impossible, max(r o ( e S); r o ( e F )) attracts exactly the F -type …rm in equilibrium. Contradiction to max(r o ( e S); r o ( e F )) < r F . 4) Suppose that r i (S) · r o (e°) < r F for e°= e S or e°= e F . Then the outside banks' bid attracts at most the F -type …rm as a customer. Clearly, r i (F )¸r F (> r o (e°)) (otherwise, the inside bank would make an expected loss on the F -…rm). Hence, the outside o¤er attracts exactly the F -…rm and makes a strictly positive expected loss because r o (e°) < r F . 5) Points 3 and 4 imply either directly that r i (S)¸r F or that r o (e°)¸r F for e°= e S and e°= e F . If the latter is true, the optimality of r i (S) again implies r i (S)¸r F . Clearly, also r i (F )¸r F .
If min(r o ( e S); r o ( e F )) > r i (S), then the inside bank would do better with a bid of r i (S) + " for " su¢ciently small, because this would allow it to realize higher pro…ts per loan without loosing customers.
If min(r o ( e S); r o ( e F )) = r i (S), then any of the winning outside banks would do better with a bid of r i (S) ¡ " for " su¢ciently small, because this would allow it to attract the S-…rm, on which it makes a strictly positive expected pro…t given its information.
Suppose, therefore, …nally that min(r o ( e S); r o ( e F )) < r i (S). By 2), max(r o ( e S); r o ( e F ))¸r i (S). Because of competition from the inside bank, r i (F ) · max(r o ( e S); r o ( e F )) or max(r o ( e S); r o ( e F )) = r F . Hence, the winning outside banks for the signal e°with r o (e°) = max(r o ( e S); r o ( e F )) make no pro…t on their o¤er. Because r e F < r F · r i (S), they would be strictly better o¤ undercutting r i (S) slightly, thus attracting both types of the …rm. Proposition 1 shows that Sharpe's (1990) Proposition 1, in which he proposes two pure-strategiy equilibria as the solutions of the bidding game, is wrong. The problem with his proof is that he correctly rules out a number of pure-strategy combinations, but not all of them, and then concludes that what is left must be an equilibrium.
The outcome described in Proposition 1 is a classical example of the winner's curse familiar from Bertrand competition and auction theory: if an outside bank wins the bidding contest, it must take into account that its success is due to its bid being attractive, but also to the fact that the inside bank did not want to bid more aggressively. Hence, the very fact of winning contains information that a rational player must take into account. Typically, in such situations pure-strategy equilibria do not exist.
The proof of Proposition 1 can easily be adapted to the case of discrete action spaces (where interest rates must be expressed in terms of a smallest unit), as long as the interest rate grid is not too coarse. The non-existence problem is, therefore, more fundamental than the simple open-set problem which causes non-existence in Bertrand competition or …rst-price auctions under complete information and which disappears with discretization.
A similar argument to the one given above shows that Sharpe's (1990) Proposition 2, which deals with the case of e°being observable by the inside bank, is incorrect, as well. Intuitively, the case of observable e°may be easier to understand than the one of unobservable e°, which is why the explicit proof given here considers the latter case. If e°is unobservable to the inside bank, inside and outside banks all observe a signal unknown to the other. Hence, it may seem that all banks can condition deterministically on their signal and thereby still obtain su¢cient randomness to rule out deviations, as, for example, in Gibbons and Katz (1991) in the context of labor markets. Proposition 1 shows that this intuition is not correct: the fact that one competitor's action cannot be predicted by the others is not enough, the competitors need to randomize actively. In the case of e°being observable to the inside bank, however, the inside bank faces no noise, and randomization is even more plausible a priori.
Equilibrium
To simplify notation and some of the calculations, I consider here the case of extreme informational asymmetry © = 0, in which the outside banks have no information. The analysis of the more general case introduced above is a relatively straightforward extension. Furthermore, I suppose that there is only one outside bank, which simpli…es the analysis, but still conveys the full intuition.
Proposition 2: The Bayesian game between the inside and one outside bank in stage 4 of the dynamic bank competition game with © = 0 has a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium. The inside bank's equilibrium strategy is to o¤er r(F ) = r F with certainty and is an atomless distribution on [r p ; r F ] for°= S, with density
The outside bank's equilibrium strategy has a point mass of 1¡p(S) at r = r F and an atomless distribution on [r p ; r F ) with density
The proof of the proposition is given in the appendix. The strategy of the proof is to …rst characterise equilibrium strategies assuming that they exist, which yields a unique characterization, and then verify that the behaviour found constitutes indeed a Nash equilibrium. It is therefore not necessary to invoke the existence theorem of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) .
Proposition 2 shows that …rms switch banks in equilibrium. In fact, a bad …rm switches whenever it receives an o¤er, which occurs with probability p(S), but even good …rms switch occasionally, namely with probability
Proposition 2 also shows that in equilibrium, full competition is only e¤ective for bad …rms. In particular, the inside bank always o¤ers the zero-pro…t interest rate r F to bad …rms. Yet, with probability p(S) bad …rms are even getting excessively favorable terms on their loan, which happens when the outside bank underbids the inside bank. In this case, the outside bank makes a strict loss on the loan. Yet, the bank is neither acting irrationally nor recklessly: in order to put up a limited degree of competition for the good risks it must optimally take into account the occasional ‡op. On average, the outside bank puts up the maximum competition possible and makes zero expected pro…ts.
By the same token, since competition by the outside bank is limited, the inside bank makes positive expected pro…ts on the good risks. Since the inside bank is indi¤erent between the interest rates in the interval [r p ; r F ], these pro…ts are proportional to (r p ¡ r S ), which can be interpreted as a measure of adverse selection in the market. In fact, as seen following equation (22) in the appendix, overall the inside bank's expected pro…ts on good risks (expectation taken over the outside bank's randomization) are given by p(S)(r p ¡ r S ). Hence, they are proportional to the success probability of the good …rm. This is reasonable, although Proposition 2 also exhibits a counterveiling e¤ect: the higher p(S), the tougher the competition by the outside bank. Moreover, the inside bank's pricing strategy, as given by (10), is quite intuitive: because h S i is decreasing, most of the pricing occurs at moderate pro…t levels (slightly above r p ), with occasional attempts to really squeeze the …rm (prices up to r F ).
Concerning the robustness of the model, Proposition 2 can be easily adapted to cover the case (1 + r F )I 2 > X 2 , in which second-period lending is not pro…table if the …rm is known to have failed in the …rst period.
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In this case, the inside bank does not continue …nancing a failed …rm and randomizes atomlessly over the range [r p ; X 2 ) with a point mass at X 2 for the successful …rm. The outside bank does not bid at all with some probability ¹, and with probability 1 ¡ ¹ it bids and randomizes atomlessly over the whole range [r p ; X 2 ].
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
Let H°i ,°2 fS; F g, denote the c.d.f. of the equilibrium mixed strategy of the inside bank, given its information°, and H o the c.d.f. of the equilibrium mixed strategy of the outside bank. As usual, H°i and H o are weakly monotone and continuous from the right, i.e. H(b r) = Pr (r · b r) for each of the three mixed strategies. De…ne H(r ¡ ) = lim t%r H(t). Finally, let°i = inffr; H°i (r) > 0g;°2 fS; F g (12) u°i = supfr; H°i (r) < 1g;°2 fS; F g (13)
denote the lower and upper end point, respectively, of the supports of the three mixed strategies. Without loss of generality we can assume that
X 2 I 2 ¡ 1] for the three di¤erent distributions considered (no repayment can be greater than what is available in the good state).
It useful to write out and label each player's expected payo¤ for any interest rate quoted, given the mixed strategy of the other:
The proof now characterizes the distributions H°i and H o in a sequence of several, more or less simple steps.
Step 1:`°i¸r°for°2 fS; F g. Proof. Obvious.
Step 2:`o¸r p . Proof. Because r F > r p , any o¤er r < r p attracts, by Step 1, the F -…rm. Therefore, the pool of applicants has at best success probability p.
Step 3:`S i¸r p . Proof. By Step 2, putting mass to the left of r p cannot be optimal.
Step 4: u o¸u S i . Proof. Suppose that u o < u S i . Then the inside bank makes zero expected pro…ts on all o¤ers r(S) 2 (u o ; u S i ]. However, by Step 3, the inside bank makes strictly positive expected pro…ts on the S-…rm.
Step 5:
Step 3. By the right-hand continuity of H°i ;°2 fS; F g, there is an " > 0 such that Step 6: u The expected net gain (given°= S) from this deviation is not smaller than
The …rst of the two terms in (18) (which corresponds to the total gain from the deviation) is strictly positive for ± su¢ciently small. The second term (corresponding to the total loss from the deviation) tends to 0 for " ! 0 by the continuity of H o at u S i . Hence, the deviation is strictly pro…table for ± and " small enough.
(b) Suppose that u S i = u o . Consider the following deviation from H o : Let ± > 0 and " > 0 be given and small. Let N " be the mass of
Move all mass of [u o ¡ "; u o ) to`F i ¡ ±. Then the expected net gain from this deviation is not smaller than
where the second term now tends to 0 for " ! 0 by Step 5.
Step 7: u 
(19) Intuitively, since mass is taken away below r F , the outside bank only gains if°= F .
Remark: If one wants to prove u F i = r F directly, one needs to havè o · r F .
Step 8: u
Since the outside bank can obtain strictly positive expected pro…ts by choosing r´1 2 (r F + u F i ), it must make strictly positive pro…ts also with H o . By Step 7, u o > r F ; hence, also H F i must make strictly positive expected pro…ts. By Steps 4 and 7, then,
which is a contradiction to the …nding that H o makes strictly positive expected pro…ts.
Step 8 implies that r i (F ) = r F with probability 1; in particular, the inside bank makes zero expected pro…ts on the F -…rm.
Step 9:
(r F + u o ) with probability 1 would yield the inside bank strictly positive expected pro…ts on the F -…rm. The equality for u S i follows from Steps 4 and 6.
Step 10: The outside bank makes zero expected pro…ts. Proof. By Steps 8 and 9, (17) simpli…es to Step 11:`o =`S i = r p . Proof. It is impossible that`o >`S i , because then the inside bank would make strictly higher pro…ts if it placed the mass of [`S i ;`o] on`o. By a similar argument for the outside bank,`o <`S i is impossible. Finally, if`o > r p , the outside bank would make strictly positive expected pro…ts, contradicting
Step 10.
Step 12: H o is continuous on [r p ; r F ). Proof. Suppose that H o (b r ¡ ) < H o (b r) for some b r 2 [r p ; r F ). Step 13 The last step has completed the characterization of the mixed strategies, because it implies that P 
The constant c in (21) can be determined by substituting any value r 2 [r p ; r F ) into (21); for r = r p one obtains c = p(S)(r p ¡ r S ). Straightforward manipulations of (21) and (22) (24) shows that H o is discontinuous at r = r F with jump 1 ¡ p(S).
This identi…es a unique mixed strategy pro…le. Because both players randomize over the whole of [r p ; r F ], there are no pro…table deviations from these strategies for either player. Proposition 2 is therefore proved.
